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Abstract
This paper provides efficient solutions to maximize profit for commercial ridesharing
services, under a pricing model with detour-based discounts for passengers. We propose
greedy heuristics for real-time ride matching that offer different trade-offs between optimal-
ity and speed. Simulations on New York City (NYC) taxi trip data show that our heuristics
are up to 90% optimal and 105 times faster than the (necessarily) exponential-time optimal
algorithm.
Commercial ridesharing service providers generate significant savings by matching
multiple ride requests using heuristic methods. The resulting savings are typically shared
between the service provider (in the form of increased profit) and the ridesharing passengers
(in the form of discounts). It is not clear a priori how this split should be effected, since
higher discounts would encourage more ridesharing, thereby increasing total savings, but
the fraction of savings taken as profit is reduced. We simulate a scenario where the
decisions of the passengers to opt for ridesharing depend on the discount offered by the
service provider. We provide an adaptive learning algorithm IDFLA that learns the optimal
profit-maximizing discount factor for the provider. An evaluation over NYC data shows
that IDFLA, on average, learns the optimal discount factor in under 16 iterations.
Finally, we investigate the impact of imposing a detour-aware routing policy based on
sequential individual rationality, a recently proposed concept. Such restricted policies offer
a better ride experience, increasing the provider’s market share, but at the cost of decreased
average per-ride profit due to the reduced number of matched rides. We construct a model
that captures these opposing effects, wherein simulations based on NYC data show that a
7% increase in market share would suffice to offset the decreased average per-ride profit.
1 Introduction
Ridesharing is a key initiative that can curb ever-increasing congestion on the urban trans-
portation network and is an important means to move the world towards a sustainable future.
While the term ridesharing has been used to include peer-to-peer carpooling platforms as well,
here we focus on commercial ridesharing service providers such as LyftLine and UberPool,
that hold a significant share of the ridesharing population.
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While ridesharing is undoubtedly appealing from a sustainability perspective, profit max-
imization is the primary goal of commercial providers. Given the emerging literature on
detour-aware pricing and routing policies, e.g., [1, 2] that enhance the ride experience, algo-
rithms for profitable ride-matching should adapt to keep up. Such quality-enhancing policies
encourage increased adoption of ridesharing, but perhaps at the cost of reduced average per-ride
profit. We study three connected issues centered around profit optimization in commercial
ridesharing.
First, it is unclear how to tune real-time ride-matching algorithms to quickly find a near-
optimal set of matches that results in high profit under detour-based discounts (the exact
optimization is an NP-hard problem [3]).
Second, ridesharing generates significant economic savings by reducing the driver-miles
necessary to serve a set of passengers, which are split between the service provider (their
profit) and the passengers (as discounts). It is not obvious how this split should be effected,
since higher discounts encourage more ridesharing, increasing total savings, but the fraction of
savings that constitutes the profit is smaller.
Third, in order to survive in an increasingly competitive market, ridesharing providers
adopt additional quality-enhancing features which do not align fully with the goal of profit
maximization, perhaps resulting in lower profit (due to the smaller feasible set of quality-
compliant rides). It is important to understand the overall impact on profitability, and ensure
that any resulting increase in market share can counter the reduced average per-ride profit.
The issues mentioned above are crucial for commercial ridesharing platforms; however, they
are less explored. We address these issues, give solutions, and provide extensive evaluation on
a real-world dataset.
1.1 Our Contributions
We investigate three important aspects of profit optimization in commercial ridesharing,
resulting in the following contributions:
• In Section 3, given a detour-based discount policy, we provide an Integer Linear Program
(ILP), and a family of efficient greedy heuristics that quickly match passengers to rides
to approximately maximize profit. We evaluate their performance experimentally.
• In Section 4, under a model in which the likelihood of opting for ridesharing depends on
the offered discount, we propose an adaptive algorithm that learns the profit-maximizing
discount parameter.
• In Section 5, we additionally impose a detour-aware routing policy based on sequential
individual rationality, introduced in [2]. Using simulations, we investigate the minimum
increase in market share needed to offset the reduced average per-ride profit.
2 Related Work
There is a huge body of literature that studies several optimization problems related to ride
sharing [4, 5, 6], but the problem of pricing in ridesharing has been relatively less studied, with
profit optimization rarely discussed. [7] characterizes the pros/cons of static versus dynamic
pricing. [1] provides heuristics for maximizing profit subject to bounded detours. In contrast,
we study profit maximization over a pricing model that incorporates a detour-based discount.
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[8] proposes a dynamic, demand-responsive ridesharing system using auction mechanisms,
where customers enjoy additive detour-based discounts. Our model considers multiplicative
detour-based discounts; moreover, we also provide an algorithm to learn the profit-maximizing
discount parameter under a suitable user choice model.
A closely related problem is that of cost sharing in peer-to-peer ridesharing or carpooling,
which, until recently, received little attention. Individual passengers are either asked to post
what they are willing to pay in advance [9], to share the total cost proportionately among
themselves according to the distances travelled [10, 11], or negotiate their shares on their own
during/after the ride. Such methods ignore the real-time costs and delays incurred during
the ride and are generally insensitive to the disproportionate delays encountered during the
ride. Fair cost sharing in ridesharing has been studied [12, 13, 14, 15, 2], but its impact on
profitability is left unexplored. We fill this gap by studying the trade-off between average
per-ride profits and market share.
3 Matching Rides to Maximize Profit
Ridesharing generates significant profit to commercial platforms such as Uber and Lyft. The
profit from a single cab is the difference between the fare paid by the passengers and the
amount paid to the driver. When compared to assigning each user their own cab, ridesharing
requires fewer cabs to serve the same set of users, leading to increased profit.
At the core of these platforms is a real-time matching algorithm that runs at regular time
intervals, and generates a set of matched users from a set of waiting users (preprocessed to
accommodate other spatio-temporal constraints). Such a system would maintain a pool of
pending requests, and then invoke the matching algorithm every few minutes to determine
optimal matches. We provide matching heuristics that directly optimize profit, under a
detour-based discount scheme. Any unmatched requests left at the end of the algorithm either
wait for another round, or, after a certain waiting time threshold elapses, are assigned fresh,
empty cabs. Thus, it is important to provide a time-efficient matching algorithm for the larger
dynamic ridesharing system to be sufficiently responsive to incoming user requests.
Moreover, under a detour-based discount policy, shared rides with smaller detours are more
likely to be profitable. However, such a myopic observation could lead to suboptimal solutions,
thus rendering the problem nontrivial.
In Section 3.1, we provide an Integer Linear Program (ILP) that matches n users to shared
cabs (each with capacity ζ) to maximize profit, given a multiplicative detour-based discount
fp(δi, τi), which is a linear function of the distance-wise (δi) and time-wise (τi) fractional
detours experienced by user i. cb is the “base” (fixed) cost for a ride, cd and ct are the costs
per unit distance and time, respectively. fd is the fraction of driver earnings taken by the
service provider.
3.1 ILP Formulation
Each user i is associated with a source-destination pair (Si, Di). We consider n initially empty
cabs and construct a complete directed graph G = (V,E) with 2n vertices that represent all
the sources and destinations, that is, V = {Si, Di}ni=1. Each directed edge e = (u, v) represents
the best route from location u to v, and weights wd(e) and wt(e) denote the corresponding
distance and time, respectively.
The ILP seeks values to assign to a set of optimization variables in order to maximize an
objective function subject to a set of constraints.
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Optimization Variables: Let xi,j,e ∈ {0, 1} denote whether or not user i is served by cab j
along edge e. Let yj,e ∈ {0, 1} denote whether cab j travels along edge e while serving one or
more users. Let zj ∈ {0, 1} denote whether cab j serves at least one user. We set xi,j,(u,v) = 0
if (u, v) /∈ E.
Objective Function:
For each user i, we have:
(a) Distance travelled, di =
∑n
j=1
∑
e∈E xi,j,ewd(e).
(b) Time in travel, ti =
∑n
j=1
∑
e∈E xi,j,ewt(e).
(c) Distance-wise fractional detour, δi =
di−wd(Si,Di)
wd(Si,Di)
.
(d) Time-wise fractional detour, τi =
ti−wt(Si,Di)
wt(Si,Di)
.
(e) The passenger’s fare is computed as,
Ci=(1−fp(δi,τi))(cb + cdwd(Si,Di)+ctwt(Si,Di)).
For each cab j, we have:
(a) Distance traveled, σj =
∑
e∈E yj,ewd(e).
(b) Time in travel, ηj =
∑
e∈E yj,ewt(e).
(c) Driver earnings, Ej = (1− fd)(cbzj + cdσj + ctηj).
Thus, the objective function to be maximized is the total profit, given by p =
∑n
i=1Ci −∑n
j=1Ej .
Constraints:
(i) yj,e = 1 if and only if xi,j,e = 1 for some i:
yj,e ≥ xi,j,e ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} ∀e ∈ E
yj,e ≤
n∑
i=1
xi,j,e ∀j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} ∀e ∈ E
(ii) zj = 1 if and only if yj,e = 1 for some e:
zj ≥ yj,e ∀j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} ∀e ∈ E
zj ≤
∑
e∈E
yj,e ∀j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}
(iii) Each user is picked up by exactly one cab:
∑
u∈V
n∑
j=1
xi,j,(Si,u) = 1 ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}
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(iv) Each user is dropped off by exactly one cab:
∑
u∈V
n∑
j=1
xi,j,(u,Di) = 1 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
(v) Each user is not served before pickup:
∑
u∈V
n∑
j=1
xi,j,(u,Si) = 0 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
(vi) Each user is not served after dropoff:
∑
u∈V
n∑
j=1
xi,j,(Di,u) = 0 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
(vii) Each user is served by a single cab, only between pickup and dropoff:∑
u∈V
xi,j,(u,v) =
∑
u∈V
xi,j,(v,u) ∀v ∈ V \ {Si, Di} ∀i ∀j
(viii) Each cab serves at most ζ users along any edge:
n∑
i=1
xi,j,e ≤ ζ ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n} ∀e ∈ E
(ix) Each cab’s overall route is not disjoint, i.e., there are no gaps between serving users
during which the cab is empty. Equivalently, if a cab serves a total of k ≥ 1 users, then
it must do so using exactly 2k − 1 edges:
∑
e∈E
yj,e ≥ 2
(
n∑
i=1
∑
u∈V
xi,j,(Si,u)
)
− 1
The inequality (≥) is to allow empty cabs (k = 0).
(x) Binary integer constraints:
xi,j,e ∈ {0, 1} ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} ∀e ∈ E
yj,e ∈ {0, 1} ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n} ∀e ∈ E
zj ∈ {0, 1} ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
Computing the optimal solution to the ILP takes a lot of time and memory, and is
unsuitable for real-time matching, which requires fast, near-optimal techniques. However, it is
a handy benchmark against which to experimentally evaluate the performance of our proposed
methods (Section 3.3).
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3.2 Heuristics for Real-Time Ride Matching
Given a set S of users matched to a cab, the driving distance and time for the best route
for serving all the users i ∈ S are denoted by d(S) and t(S), respectively. For each user
i ∈ S, di(S) and ti(S) denote the driving distance and time from Si to Di along that route,
respectively. Thus, the profit from a cab serving a set of users S can be computed as follows:
• User Cost: The cost of the ride to user i ∈ S,
Ci(S)=(1−fp(δi(S), τi(S))) (cb+cddi({i})+ctti({i})) , (1)
where δi(S)=di(S)−di({i})di({i}) , and τi(S)=
ti(S)−ti({i})
ti({i}) .
• Driver Earnings: The earnings to the driver from the ride,
E(S) = (1− fd) · (cb + cdd(S) + ctt(S)) . (2)
• Profit: The profit to the service provider,
p(S) =
∑
i∈S
Ci(S)− E(S). (3)
The incremental profit of merging two cabs (combining the users matched to two cabs into
one and removing the other cab from the system), serving sets of users Sj and Sk is:
∆p(Sj ,Sk) = p(Sj ∪ Sk)− p(Sj)− p(Sk). (4)
The above framework for real-time ride matching is more general than that of the ILP. A
limitation of the ILP is that fp(·) is restricted to be a linear function. Moreover, it may not be
possible for an ILP to explicitly incorporate additional detour-aware routing constraints and
user preferences. However, during performance evaluation of our proposed methods, we limit
the scope to the constraints listed in Section 3.1, in order to compare against the optimal ILP
solution.
(a) Total profit obtained by various methods (b) Time taken by different methods.
Figure 1. Comparison of various heuristic matching methods according to the total profit and
running time methods with small-sized set of trip requests.
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Greedy-Max-Profit-Based Method:
We now describe a greedy method for profit-maximizing real-time matching. We begin by
assigning each of n input users to their “own” cab, i.e., no two users are assigned to the same
cab.1 We maintain two collections of cabs, namely, a set of unavailable cabs U and a current
pool of cabs A. We initialize A with the n single-user cabs and U = ∅. We repeatedly perform
the following steps until A is empty, at which point, we return U as the output:
(a) For every two cabs j and k in A, if it is feasible to merge them subject to the capacity
constraint (and any other optional constraints), compute the corresponding incremental
profit pjk = ∆p(Sj ,Sk).
(b) Find two cabs j∗ and k∗ such that pj∗k∗ is maximum. If pj∗k∗ < 0, terminate and return
U ∪ A as output. Otherwise, merge them and replace the individual cabs j∗ and k∗ in A
with the merged cab. If the merged cab has ζ passengers, move it from A to U .
Note that each iteration either terminates the method, or decreases the size of A by at least
one; therefore, the method terminates after at most n− 1 iterations. The time complexity of
this method is O(n2 log n).
Greedy-Order-Based Methods:
Now we describe a family of faster greedy heuristics (parameterized by an order protocol).
We create an ordered list L of the initial n single-user cabs according to a certain order, and
initialize the set of unavailable cabs U = ∅. At each iteration, we pick the cab at the top of
the list (say j) and merge it with the first cab k down the list such that pjk > 0, subject to
the capacity constraint (and any other optional constraints), remove the individual cabs j and
k from L and insert the merged cab at the appropriate position in L. If no such cab k exists,
then j is moved from L to U . If the merged cab has ζ passengers, we move it from L to U .
These methods have a time complexity of O(n log n).
3.3 Experimental Performance Evaluation
In order to compare the performance of our proposed greedy methods, we evaluate them
against the optimal solution computed by solving the ILP of Section 3.1. Since the ILP takes
a prohibitively long time to output the optimal solution, we first evaluate the near-optimality
of our methods using a small dataset, and then use a larger dataset for demonstrating the
scalability and comparing the speed-optimality trade-off of our proposed heuristics among
themselves. We consider two orders when evaluating Greedy-Order-Based methods:
(a) Distance Order: Decreasing order of d(S).
(b) Profit Order: Increasing order of p(S).
Experimental Setup:
We evaluate our methods using publicly available New York City (NYC) taxi trip data [16].
The 19GB dataset has logs for all NYC trips taken in 2013. Each trip in the dataset specifies
pickup and dropoff coordinates, pickup time, dropoff time, trip distance and travel time. Each
1We assume that all cabs are initially empty; however, our methods extend to a more general case where
some cabs already have passengers in them with their own constraints to begin with.
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Figure 2. Total Profit earned using various methods on large dataset of ∼19000 trip requests.
trip is considered as a “user” for our simulation. We assume that each cab serves at most
ζ = 3 users.
We discretize the underlying NYC map into grids of 100m2 area and select 2543 rep-
resentative landmarks using the methodology of [17]. We precompute the inter-landmark
distance and time using Open Trip Planner [18]. For each user, we map their source and
destination coordinates to their nearest representative landmarks and use the precomputed
values for computing necessary metrics such as profit, detour, driving distance and time. The
values cb, cd, ct, and fd are taken from publicly available Lyft user pricing and driver payment
data [19, 20].
Experimental Results:
We select NYC taxi trips on randomly chosen days of 2013, between 7:45 - 8:00 pm. We
intentionally choose the rush times, since many shared rides would be possible, and it would
be interesting to see how our proposed heuristics perform. We run our methods on several
subsamples by considering a different number of users each time (5, 8, 10, 15, 20, and 22). We
compare the total profit generated (Figure 1a) and the total time taken (Figure 1b) across
each method, averaged over the small-sized subsamples of users. We observe that the total
profit obtained by the Greedy-Max-Profit-Based method is up to 90% optimal and runs 105
times faster than the optimal algorithm on a machine with a quad Intel Core i7 processor with
32GB RAM. The optimal algorithm becomes intractable for instances where the number of
users exceeds 25 (terminated after over 14.22 hours due to lack of memory).
Our proposed algorithms scale to a larger input set with ∼19000 users (obtained from a
one-hour slot). The Greedy-Max-Profit-Based method takes ∼35 minutes while the Distance-
Order-Based and Profit-Order-Based methods take 7 and 4 minutes, respectively.2 Figure 2
shows that the performance of the former is significantly better than that of the latter methods
in terms of the total profit. Thus, the speed-optimality trade-off becomes important in choosing
the method that best suits the needs of a service provider. Finally, we also observe that
the Greedy-Max-Profit-Based method matches ∼19000 users into 6701 cabs (reducing the
operational cost significantly), obtaining a profit of ∼$134, 500.
2If the matching algorithm is invoked once per minute, in NYC, there are only ∼300 requests per minute on
average, for which all of our proposed greedy methods finish in less than a second.
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4 Learning the Optimal Discount Policy
In the previous section, we laid out efficient ride-matching heuristics to maximize profit under
a fixed detour-based discount for users. In this section, our goal is to learn the optimal
detour-based discount policy, under a fixed ride-matching algorithm. For simplicity, we assume
that the detour-based discount is a linear function of the fractional distance-wise detour. Thus,
the discount to a user i ∈ S is given by
fθp (δi(S)) = tan(θ)δi(S) + b, (5)
where b is a constant denoting the minimum discount given to a user (to incentivize them
to opt for ridesharing in the first place), and the discount parameter θ ∈ [0◦, 90◦) governs
how steeply the discount increases with the detour. Figure 3 plots (5) for various values of θ,
assuming b = 10%.
Figure 3: Various discount functions.
Let P(θ) denote the probability of a user opting to rideshare, a nondecreasing function
of θ. A larger θ would lead to a larger population of users who are willing to rideshare, and
potentially more shared rides; however, the profit from each shared ride would be smaller.
Since the expected total profit depends on the number of users opting to rideshare, as well as
the per-ride profit, it is important to find a value of θ that provides the optimal balance to
maximize the expected total profit. We propose a method, which we call Iterative Discount
Function Learning Algorithm (IDFLA), that learns such a θ over a period of time.
Each day, a value of θ is declared by the service provider. In response, the users who
opt for ridesharing are then matched throughout the day using one of the heuristics from
Section 3.2. The total profit earned is computed at the end of the day. IDFLA (Algorithm 1)
learns the expected daily profit earned using different values of θ, and eventually converges to
the best θ∗ that maximizes this quantity. This kind of sequential decision making in stochastic
environment can be categorized as a stochastic multi-armed bandit problem [21], where the
θ values are the arms, and the daily profit earned by using a certain θ is the reward earned
by pulling the corresponding arm. IDFLA uses a popular technique for solving stochastic
multi-armed bandit problems, called UCB1 [22].
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Algorithm 1 IDFLA
1: Input: A finite number of θ values in an array Θ
2: Ph stores the total profit with Θ[h]
3: kh stores the number of days Θ[h] is declared
4: for t← 1 to |Θ| do
5: Choose Θ[t] on tth day
6: Observe profit earned p;
7: Set Pt ← p;
8: Set kt ← 1;
9: Find h∗ = arg maxh Ph;
10: for t← |Θ|+ 1, |Θ|+ 2, . . . do
11: Choose Θ[h∗] on tth day
12: Observe profit earned p;
13: Update Ph∗ ← Ph∗ + p;
14: Update kh∗ ← kh∗ + 1;
15: Find h∗=arg max
h
(
Ph
kh
+
√
2 ln t
kh
)
for (t+ 1)th day;
4.1 Performance Evaluation of IDFLA
We evaluate our learning method IDFLA under the Greedy-Max-Profit-Based ride-matching
heuristic. We take Θ = {10◦, 20◦, 30◦, 40◦, 50◦, 60◦, 70◦, 80◦}, and run IDFLA to find near-
optimal discount parameter, Θ[h∗]. The value of optimal discount parameter depends on
P(·) which is the probability of opting rideshare. For simulating the user-behavior, we need
to assume P(·) to be any non-decreasing function of θ. In practice, this probability P(θ) is
estimated while the optimal θ is learnt (step 14 of IDFLA). This corresponds to the fraction of
times (kθ) the users have opted for ridesharing whenever the discount parameter was θ. The
P(θ) function that we have assumed for our simulation, is shown in Figure 4.
Taxi trips in NYC between 7:45 - 8:00 pm of the 52 Wednesdays of 2013 were used to
compare the performance of IDFLA with an “oracle” method (BDF) that knows the Best
Discount Function apriori. Figure 5 shows the average daily profit obtained by declaring the
same discount function everyday. We observe that the best discount function is obtained when
θ = 40◦; therefore, BDF chooses θ = 40◦ everyday.
Figure 6a shows that the discount parameter selected by IDFLA converges to that of BDF
in 16 days. We also observe (Figure 6b) that the average daily profit, that is, the cumulative
total profit over t days divided by t, converges to that of the best discount function BDF. We
show that after 52 days, the difference3 in average daily profit obtained by IDFLA and BDF is
just $9.58, or 2.67%. Thus, IDFLA quickly learns the optimal discount parameter that can
help the service provider maximize profit while keeping users sufficiently happy by providing
suitable discounts.
3The difference between the average reward of a learning algorithm to that of the optimal is called regret.
An upper bound on the regret of UCB1 after T iterations is O(log T ) [22], when each arm’s reward is a bounded
random variable.
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Figure 4: Probability of opting for a shared ride.
Figure 5: The average daily profit obtained by various discount functions over 52 days
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(a) Comparing the daily profit obtained by IDFLA and BDF.
(b) The average daily profit of IDFLA converging to that of BDF.
Figure 6: Comparing IDFLA and BDF
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5 Impact of Detour-Aware Routing
In conjunction with desirable pricing schemes for ridesharing users, recent work has proposed
detour-aware routing policies that impose upper bounds on the total detour [1] (static) or
incremental detours [2] (dynamic). Such detour-aware routing policies work together with
detour-based discount policies in order to enhance the quality of the ride experience for
ridesharing users. This induces a similar trade-off as the one in Section 4: imposing additional
quality-enhancing constraints into the ride-matching process incentivizes greater adoption of
ridesharing and increases the market share of the ridesharing population, but could result in
reduced average per-ride profit. In this section, we consider the impact of one such detour-aware
routing policy, based on the concept of Sequential Individual Rationality (SIR), introduced
by [2].
SIR guarantees that the disutility to existing users (sum of the monetary cost and an
“inconvenience cost” due to detours) in a shared ride is non-increasing as additional users
are picked up. A parameterized version of SIR, called SIR-γ, ensures that the incremental
benefit (decrease in disutility) to an existing user upon picking up a new user is at least
γ, where γ ≥ 0. Imposing SIR-γ results in a reduced set of feasible matched rides, leading
not only to reduced average per-ride profit, but also a potential loss due to the “up-front
discounts” (the parameter b in (5)) given to the passengers who opt for ridesharing, but end
up being unmatched. However, the resulting detour-aware routing policy improves the quality
of shared rides, thereby increasing the market share of ridesharing users, which could offset
these negative effects. Unlike [2] that looks at the detour-aware routing policy from the user
perspective (especially fairness), in this work we answer such a scheme’s impact on the service
provider’s profit.
We investigate this phenomenon by performing experiments to address the following
questions:
(a) What is the trade-off between fewer matched rides and increased market share, compared
to a scenario where no SIR-γ is imposed? How does this affect the profit?
(b) How sensitive is the profit to the fraction of additional users who opt for ridesharing in
response to the adoption of detour-aware routing by imposing SIR-γ?
5.1 Experimental Setup
As before, we use NYC taxi trip data for our experiments. We randomly select a weekday
of 2013 and a one hour time slot on that day. We then split the hour into 60 one-minute
instances, and collect the sources and destinations for the users who initiated trips in each
instance. The average number of users per instance is 210.85. While reporting our results, we
take an average across these 60 instances.
The parameters cb, cd, ct, and fd are taken from publicly available Lyft user pricing and
driver payment for NYC [19, 20]. We select “detour-sensitivities” αi (higher values imply more
aversion to detours) randomly from [$0, $5] per mile.We assume that each cab serves at most
ζ = 2 users, so that the profit maximization problem can be solved optimally in polynomial
time using Edmond’s algorithm [23].4 The driving distance and time between locations are
obtained by querying Open Trip Planner [18]. The parameters of the linear detour-based
discount policy (5) are θ = 40◦ and b = 10%. To begin with, before imposing SIR-γ, we
4The experiments can be carried out for ζ > 2 as well, by using one of our proposed heuristics from Section 3.2
instead.
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Figure 7: Profit versus SIR parameter γ.
assume that the service provider’s initial market share is 60%, within which each user opts for
ridesharing with a probability directly proportional to θ and b, and inversely proportional to
αi.
For each instance, we keep the following fixed: user origins, destinations, whether they
are part of the initial market share, and if so, whether they opted for ridesharing. Then, we
generate 30 realizations, where each user reacts to the adoption of a detour-aware routing policy
(SIR-γ), by flipping biased coins parameterized by cin, which is a measure of how strongly
users value a quality-enhancing detour-aware routing policy. This participatory behavior is
one of many that can be used. For any behavior model, our primary interest is the fraction
of users who end up opting for ridesharing, and not the generative process itself. In the
coin-flip-based process, the first group of users, who are in the initial market share but did
not opt for ridesharing, flip with bias pin that is directly proportional to θ, b, and γ, and
inversely proportional to αi, with cin denoting the constant of proportionality. The second
group of users, who are outside the initial market share, flip with bias 0.5pin (the factor 0.5 is
hand-picked). The users who had already opted for ridesharing remain so. For consistency,
we ensure that as we increase the value of γ, only users who have previously not opted for
ridesharing flip again.
We calculate the profit obtained by matching users in the new market share. The parameter
cin is varied from 100 and 1000, while γ is varied from 0 to 0.9.
5.2 Experimental Results
Figure 7 shows profitability as γ increases for various values of cin. The baseline profit, without
SIR-γ, is shown as a horizontal line. For any value of cin ≥ 200, there is a range of γ for which
a higher profit can be obtained by imposing the appropriate SIR-γ policy. Moreover, when γ
is high, the profit declines, because too many users remain unmatched.
Figure 8 shows a different visualization by plotting profitability as a function of cin, for
different values of γ.
Figure 9 plots the minimum increase in market share that is necessary to meet a given
lower bound on the profit, as a function of γ. For instance, to be 5% more profitable, a 13%
increase is needed, as shown by the green curve. Alternatively, Figure 10 shows the maximum
possible increase in profit (over all γ), as a function of the increase in market share. The key
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Figure 8: Sensitivity of profit to cin.
Figure 9: Marketshare versus γ for a given profit lower bound.
takeaway here is that a 7% increase5 in market share is sufficient to recover from the negative
effects (on the profit) of adopting a detour-aware routing policy.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we adopt a profit-centric view of real-time ridesharing system design, and
undertake an empirical investigation of three key elements that impact profit, namely (a) real-
time ride matching, (b) user discounts, and (c) detour-aware routing, by using publicly available
NYC taxi trip data.
An optimal ride matching algorithm, even on a small set of 22 requests, can take hours,
while our greedy heuristics generate near-optimal profit in less than 1/105 of the time, and
scale well, e.g., matching 18794 trip requests into 6701 cabs, while offering different trade-offs
5A 7% increase in market share in response to a quality-enhancing policy is not unrealistic. Lyft’s market
share increased by over 70% in 2016, owing in large part to better quality of service, resulting in Lyft’s customers
being happier than those of their primary competitor, Uber [24].
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Figure 10: Profit versus marketshare increase.
between optimality and running time. Our adaptive learning algorithm called IDFLA learns
the optimal detour-based discount parameter that achieves the right balance between the
number of passengers who opt for ridesharing and the portion of savings taken as profit from
each shared ride, within 16 iterations. Finally, we demonstrate that even a small market
share increase of 7%, in response to other restricted detour-aware policies such as sequential
individual rationality, is sufficient to counter the reduced per-ride profit due to the restricted
constraints. Thus, one of our contributions is also a holistic treatment of the framework for
detour-aware policies.
Given the encouraging empirical results of our proposed solutions for profit optimization,
future work should explore corresponding theoretical results, e.g., approximation guarantees
for the proposed greedy ride-matching heuristics, regret bounds for the proposed learning
algorithm IDFLA, and a formal mathematical analysis to characterize the dependence between
profit under a detour-aware routing policy and market share of users who opt for ridesharing.
Another interesting direction to explore is the interplay between these different elements, e.g.,
how does a detour-aware routing policy affect the performance of the ride-matching heuristics
and the convergence of the learning algorithm?
References
[1] J. Jung, R. Jayakrishnan, and J. Y. Park, “Design and modeling of real-time shared-taxi
dispatch algorithms,” in Proc. Transportation Research Board 92nd Annual Meeting, 2013.
[2] R. Gopalakrishnan, K. Mukherjee, and T. Tulabandhula, “The costs and benefits
of ridesharing: Sequential individual rationality and sequential fairness,” CoRR, vol.
abs/1607.07306, 2016.
[3] J.-F. Cordeau, G. Laporte, M. W. Savelsbergh, and D. Vigo, “Vehicle routing,” in
Handbooks in operations research and management science: Transportation. Elsevier,
2006, vol. 14, ch. 6, pp. 367–428.
16
[4] M. Furuhata, M. Dessouky, F. Ordo´n˜ez, M.-E. Brunet, X. Wang, and S. Koenig, “Rideshar-
ing: The state-of-the-art and future directions,” Transportation Research Part B: Method-
ological, vol. 57, pp. 28–46, 2013.
[5] N. Agatz, A. Erera, M. Savelsbergh, and X. Wang, “Optimization for dynamic ride-sharing:
A review,” European Journal of Operational Research, vol. 223, no. 2, pp. 295–303, 2012.
[6] D. Pelzer, J. Xiao, D. Zehe, M. H. Lees, A. C. Knoll, and H. Aydt, “A partition-based
match making algorithm for dynamic ridesharing,” IEEE Transactions on Intelligent
Transportation Systems, vol. 16, no. 5, pp. 2587–2598, 2015.
[7] S. Banerjee, R. Johari, and C. Riquelme, “Pricing in ride-sharing platforms: A queueing-
theoretic approach,” in Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and
Computation, 2015, pp. 639–639.
[8] D. T. Nguyen, “Fair cost sharing auction mechanisms in last mile ridesharing,” Ph.D.
dissertation, Singapore Management University, 2013.
[9] B. Cao, L. Alarabi, M. F. Mokbel, and A. Basalamah, “SHAREK: A scalable dynamic
ride sharing system,” in Proceedings of the 16th IEEE International Conference on Mobile
Data Management (MDM), 2015, pp. 4–13.
[10] R. Geisberger, D. Luxen, S. Neubauer, P. Sanders, and L. Volker, “Fast detour computation
for ride sharing,” in Proceedings of the 10th Workshop on Algorithmic Approaches for
Transportation Modelling, Optimization, and Systems, OASIcs-OpenAccess Series in
Informatics, vol. 14. Schloss Dagstuhl-Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik, 2010, pp. 88–99.
[11] N. A. Agatz, A. L. Erera, M. W. Savelsbergh, and X. Wang, “Dynamic ride-sharing:
A simulation study in metro atlanta,” Transportation Research Part B: Methodological,
vol. 45, no. 9, pp. 1450–1464, 2011.
[12] F. Bistaffa, A. Farinelli, G. Chalkiadakis, and S. Ramchurn, “Recommending fair payments
for large-scale social ridesharing,” in Proceedings of the 9th ACM Recommender Systems
Conference (RecSys), 2015, pp. 139–146.
[13] A. Kleiner, B. Nebel, and V. A. Ziparo, “A mechanism for dynamic ride sharing based on
parallel auctions,” in Proceedings of the Twenty-Second International Joint Conference
on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), 2011, pp. 266–272.
[14] D. Zhao, D. Zhang, E. H. Gerding, Y. Sakurai, and M. Yokoo, “Incentives in ridesharing
with deficit control,” in Proceedings of the 2014 international conference on Autonomous
agents and multi-agent systems (AAMAS), 2014, pp. 1021–1028.
[15] E. Kamar and E. Horvitz, “Collaboration and shared plans in the open world: Studies of
ridesharing,” in IJCAI, 2009, pp. 187–194.
[16] C. Whong and A. Monroy-Herna´ndez, “New York City taxi trips,” http://
www.andresmh.com/nyctaxitrips, 2013, last accessed: 2016-06-18.
[17] T. Rajasubramaniam, K. Mukherjee, G. Raravi, A. Metrewar, N. Annamaneni, and
K. Chattopadhyay, “Xhare-a-ride: A search optimized dynamic ride sharing system with
approximation guarantee,” in IEEE International Conference on Data Engineering, 2017.
17
[18] “Open Trip Planner,” https://www.opentripplanner.org, 2016.
[19] LyftLine, “Lyft Line Driver Pay,” https://help.lyft.com/hc/en-us/articles/213582268-
Lyft-Line-Driver-Pay, 2016.
[20] ——, “Lyft Line Pricing,” https://help.lyft.com/hc/en-us/articles/213815178-Lyft-Line-
Pricing, 2016.
[21] S. Bubeck and N. Cesa-Bianchi, “Regret analysis of stochastic and nonstochastic multi-
armed bandit problems,” 2012, arXiv preprint arXiv:1204.5721.
[22] P. Auer, N. Cesa-Bianchi, and P. Fischer, “Finite-time analysis of the multiarmed bandit
problem,” Machine Learning, vol. 47, no. 2-3, pp. 235–256, 2002.
[23] J. Edmonds, “Paths, trees, and flowers,” Canadian Journal of mathematics, vol. 17, no. 3,
pp. 449–467, 1965.
[24] A. Swan, “Sorry, Uber. Social Data Validates The Lyft Growth Story And Valuation
Demands,” http://www.forbes.com/sites/andyswan/2016/08/31/sorry-uber-social-data-
validates-the-lyft-growth-story-and-valuation-demands/, 2016.
18
